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NEWS&ANALYSIS

Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology:

Some Preliminary Observations
by Glenn Harlan Reynolds

T

vironment
is a complex
the one hand,
he relationship
between one.
new On
technologies
and various
the enhuman technologies-ranging from "low" technologies
like slash-and-bum agriculture, to "high" technologies like
nuclear weapons-have done more than their share of environmental harm. On the other hand, new technologies are
often cleaner and safer than the older technologies they replace, and may offer ways of remedying environmental
harms previously thought of as beyond help.
Both of these aspects are likely to come into play with
molecular nanotechnology, a technology so new that, in
truth, it barely exists yet. But though the actual accomplishments of nanotechnology at this date fall into the workbench
or proof-of-concept stage, research is progressing at a speed
that outpaces the predictions of the most optimistic prognosticators. 1 (Indeed, nanotechnology has received so much attention-not all of it positive 2-that some are already pronouncing it a clich.) If researchers continue to make progress at this rate, nanotechnology will hit the marketplace
more quickly than did biotechnology, a field of endeavor to
which society is still adjusting. It thus seems worthwhile to
begin the discussion now.
This all-too-brief essay will outline the basic nature of
molecular nanotechnology. It will then discuss the likely environmental benefits (environmentalist Terence McKenna,
writing in the Whole Earth Review, called nanotechnology
"the most radical of the green visions") 4 and harms (some
critics worry that rogue nanodevices will devour the
The author is a Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of
Law. Some of the ideas in this Article first appeared in Frederick A.
Fiedler & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An
Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 593 (1994); others are the result of

conversations and exchanges, too numerous to list or even recall, on
http://www.nanodot.org, http://www.slashdot.org, at various Foresight
Institute conferences, and elsewhere. Development of the necessary legal
thinking in this areas is a group project; this Article is in part intended to

encourage many more to join in. Thanks to Keri White for her usual excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Kelly Morris, Macrodoctor, Come Meet the Nanodoctors,
357 LANCET 778 (2001) (describing progress in medical
nanotechnology); Researchers Assemble Molecular Gear: University ofTokyo Team Scores First by Building Functional Nanodevice,
NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 19, 2001 (n.p.); Fiona Harvey, Toughened by
Nanotechnology, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 15,2001, at 14. For an extensive
overview of medical nanotechnology, see ROBERT A. FREITAS JR.,

(1999).
2. Nanotechnology has already been denounced by antitechnology
NANOMEDICINE VOLUME ONE: BASIC CAPABILITIES

activists like Jeremy Rifkin and Kirkpatrick Sale. Ronald Bailey,
Rebels Against the Future: Witnessing the Birth of the Global
Antitechnology Movement, Reason Online, Feb. 28, 2001, at
http://reason.com/rb/rb022801.html.
3. Gail Collins, Bring on the Nanobots, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2001, at

A23.
4. Quoted in K. ERIC DREXLER ET AL., UNBOUNDING THE FUTURE

182 (1991).

planet) 5 of this technology, and at least seek to begin the
discussion of how nanotechnology might be dealt with in a
way that will maximize the environmental benefits-which
are likely to be enormous-while minimizing the potential
harms, which, if allowed to materialize, are likely to be large
as well.
The Science and Technology of Nanotechnology
How Nanotechnology Works

Put simply, nanotechnology is a technology for making
things by placing atoms precisely where they are supposed
to go. Traditional industrial technologies operate from the
top down. Blocks or chunks of raw material are cast, sawed,
or machined into precisely formed products by removing
unwanted matter. Results of such processes may be rather
small (integrated circuits with structures measured in microns, for example) or very large (ocean liners or jumbo
jets). However, in all cases matter is being
processed in
6
chunks far larger than molecular scale.
We are used to this kind of top-down technology, and it
is certainly capable of yielding products of fairly high precision and complexity. It is the basis of our civilization,
and it has brought us the many technological revolutions
described above. It is, however, something of an aberration
in the natural order of things, as most products of living
organisms-and those organisms themselves-are made
very differently.
Rather than being produced through large chunks of material being sawed, planed, and ground to form, most such
objects are constructed by tiny molecular machines, such as
cells and organelles, working from the bottom up. By organizing individual atoms and molecules into particular configurations, these molecular machines are able to create
works of astonishing complexity and size, such as the human brain, a coral reef, or a redwood tree.7 This approach
can produce results that would seem impossible ifjudged by
the standards of conventional top-down production technology, but that are taken for granted in their proper context.
For example, the human body begins as a single cell, a fertilized ovum. Yet a mature human being consists of approximately 75 trillion cells, complexly arranged and of many
different varieties.8 The molecular machinery responsible
for this amazing, though commonplace, feat of production
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
6. K. Eric Drexler, Nanotechnology Summary, in 1990 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE YEARBOOK

162, 163-67

(describing top-down and bottom-up approaches).

7. Id at 175.
8. ARTHUR GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 2 (1986).
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is capable of such dramatic results because it performs operations in parallel (that is, with many cells operating at the
same time through most of the growth process), and from
the bottom up.
As Eric Drexler states:
Nature shows that molecules can serve as machines because living things work by means of such machinery.
Enzymes are molecular machines that make, break, and
rearrange the bonds holding other molecules together.
Muscles are driven by molecular machines that haul fibers past one another. DNA serves as a data-storage system, transmitting digital instructions to molecular machines, the ribosomes, that manufacture protein molecules. And these protein molecules, in turn, make up
most of the molecular machinery just described. 9
Putting these natural molecular machines to work is nothing
new, of course, as every living thing does so constantly. Nor
is deliberate human programming of those machines particularly new, as it is what genetic engineering (or even selective breeding) is all about.' 0 What makes nanotechnology
different is that it involves the attempt to go farther than natural mechanisms permit. Using special bacterium-sized "assembler" devices, nanotechnology would permit exact control of molecular structures that are not readily manipulable
by organic means (diamond, or heavy metals, for example)
on a programmable basis."
With nanotechnology, atoms will be specifically placed
and connected, all at very rapid rates, in a fashion similar to
processes found in living organisms. Trees, mammals, and
far less complex organisms make use of molecular machinery to manufacture and undertake repairs at a cellular and
subcellular level. The key to the application of
nanotechnology will be the development of processes that
control placement of individual atoms to form
2 products of
great complexity at extremely small scale.'
This approach was originally suggested by physicist
Richard Feynman. In an article entitled There s Plenty of
Room at the Bottom, Feynman explored the potential of
atomic-scale physical manipulation of matter. As
Feynman said:
The principles of physics, as far as Ican see, do not speak
against the possibility of maneuvering things atom by
atom. [I]t would be, in principle, possible.. . for a physicist to synthesize any chemical substance that the chemist writes down.... How? Put the atoms down where the
chemist says, and so you make the substance. The prob10. R. Williamson, MolecularBiology in Relationto Medical Genetics,
AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS

Emery & David Rimoin eds., 1983).
11. K. ERIC DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS:

17-18 (Alan

Scientists and researchers are making progress in this direction today. Already, IBM's research division has demonstrated the ability to manipulate individual atoms by constructing a copy of IBM's logo out of individual xenon atoms, manipulated by the tip of an atomic force microscope.1 4 The next step, the precise placement of atoms in
combination to form stable
compounds, 5 and structures,
16
has also been achieved.

Such efforts have already generated a substantial amount
of theoretical literature, and considerable concrete interest.
Nanotechnoloy has already produced a number of books
and articles,' government reports, 8 and at least one
well-established and well-funded research program-unfortunately in Japan, not the United States, though the
United States is now forgin ahead with its own National
Nanotechnology Initiative. N
What Nanotechnology Can Do

Full-fledged nanotechnology promises nothing less than
complete control over the physical structure of matter-the
same kind of control over the molecular and structural
makeup of physical objects that a word processor provides
over the form and content of a text. The implications of such
capabilities are significant: to dramatize only slightly, they
are comparable to producing a 747 airplane or an ocean liner
from the mechanical equivalent of a single fertilized egg.
13. Richard Feynman, There's Plenty ofRoom at the Bottom, in MINIATURIZATION

14.

282, 295-96 (H.D. Gilbert ed., 1961).

DREXLER ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 96-98.

15. Id.at 97-98.
16. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
17. Books on nanotechnology include FREITAs JR., supra note 1; K.
ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION (rev. ed. 1990) (the first
book-length treatment of the subject) [hereinafter DREXLER,
ENGINES OF CREATION]; DREXLER ET AL., supra note 4 (the most

popularly oriented treatment); and DREXLER,

13, 255 (1992) [hereinafter DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS]; Drexler, supra note 6, at 170.
12. See New Technologiesfora SustainableWorld, HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space, Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. 21 (1992) (testi-

mony of Dr. Eric Drexler) [hereinafter New Technologies Hearings]
The basis of this technology, as I said, is building with molecular building blocks and precise positional control. This molecule-by-molecule control can become the basis of a manufacturing technology that is cleaner and more efficient than
anything we know today. It is a fundamentally different way
of processing matter to make products that people want.

supra note 1t, at 1-5.

NANOSYSTEMS,

supra

note 11 (the most technically oriented of the three); PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST FORESIGHT CONFERENCE ON NANOTECHNOLOGY (B.C.

Crandall & James Lewis eds., 1991). Articles include The Invisible
Factory, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1989 (a clear, nontechnical account
of nanotechnology); Molecular Tools for Nanomanufacturing,Sci.
NEWS, Nov. 21, 1992, at 343; Christine Peterson, Nanotechnology:
BRIT. INTERPLANETARY

Soc'Y 395

(1992); Ralph Merkle, Self Replicating Systems and Molecular
Manufacturing, 45 J. BRIT. INTERPLANETARY Soc'Y 407 (1992);
Paul Saffo, Think Small; And Mechanical,PERS. COMPUTING, Sept.
1989, at 219; Harvey Newquist, Computers Smaller Than a Fly,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 15,

MOLECULAR MACHINERY,

MANUFACTURING, AND COMPUTATION 10,

DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS,

lems of chemistry and biology can be greatly helped if
our ability to see what we are doing, and to do things on
an atomic level, is ultimately developed-a development which I think cannot be avoided.

Evolution of the Concept, 45 J.

9. Drexler, supra note 6, at 162.
in PRINCIPLES
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18. See, e.g.,

1988, at 19.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECH. POLICY, SCI-

ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

170 (1993);

U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, MINIATURIZATION TECHNOLOGIES 20-22 (1991) (both describing nanotechnology

and its strategic importance).
19. Update on Japanese Biomolecular Machine Research, INSIDE
R&D, Feb. 26, 1992, at 8 (describing Japanese research into molecular machines); Teri Sprackland, Mini-SensorsStake Out Mega-Markets, ELECTRONIC BUS., Feb. 10, 1992, at 53 (reporting that Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is funding research into nanotechnology in the amount of $200 million). For
some of the recent fruit of this emphasis, see ResearchersAssemble
Molecular Gear, supra note 1. Information on the U.S. National

Nanotechnology Initiative current through the fiscal year 2001 budget cycle can be found at http://www.nano.gov.
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Using nanotechnology, production would be carried out
by large numbers of tiny devices, operating in parallel, in a
fashion similar to the molecular machinery already found in
living organisms. 20 However, these "nanodevices" would
not suffer from the constraints facing living organisms-they would not have to be made of protein, or other
substances readily extractable from the natural environment, nor would they have to be capable of reproducing
themselves. Instead, they could be constructed of whatever
material, and in whatever fashion, is most suited to their
task. Known as "assemblers," these tiny devices would be
capable of manipulating individual molecules very rapidly
and precisely.21 The process of using such assemblers to
manufacture products may be hard for many readers to visualize; the following explains how this could work.
Nowadays, some medicines are made through biotechnological processes, for example those using recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).22 In essence, this means that
the DNA of living creatures (usually bacteria) is altered so
that the creatures are reprogrammed to produce the desired
substance by assembling component atoms into the desired
configurations: hydrogen here, carbon there, and so on. This
approach represents a revolution in pharmaceutical technology, but has distinct limitations. Since biotechnology is
based on altering the program of living organisms, only substances that can be handled by living organisms can be manufactured; only mechanisms possessed by living organisms
can be used. It is as if clothing were manufactured by training spiders and silkworms to weave their product in particular patterns.
By contrast, modem textile technology represents a far
more powerful, more versatile, and easier approach to manufacturing clothing. Nanotechnology represents a similar
approach to the manufacture of other goods, including
pharmaceuticals. Imagine the power and complexity of today's computer-driven textile looms put into machines orders of magnitude smaller than the period at the end of this
sentence. Instead of weaving cloth, such machines would
seize individual atoms using selectively sticky manipulator
arms, then "plug" those atoms together (somewhat like as20. See New Technologies Hearings,supra note 12, at 21 ("In working

with molecular building blocks, it resembles processes we see in
farms and in forests and, like those processes, rather than consuming
fossil fuels and emitting CO 2, it can take sunlight and CO 2 and con-

vert them into products, acting as a net CO 2 consumer."). Cf.
GUYTON, supra note 8, at 35-37 (describing processes used by organic cells).
21. See DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION, supra note 17, at 56-63, 57

(describing assemblers).
These assemblers will work fast. A fast enzyme, such as carbonic anhydrase or ketosteroid isomerase, can process almost
a million molecules per second, even without conveyors and
power-driven mechanisms to slap a new molecule into place
as soon as an old one is released .... An assembler arm will
be about fifty million times shorter than a human arm, and so
(as it turns out) it will be able to move back and forth about
fifty million times more rapidly. For an assembler arm to
move a mere million times per second would be like a human
arm moving about once per minute: sluggish. So it seems a
very reasonable goal.
22. See, e.g., E.D.P. De Robertis & E.M.F. DeRobertis, The Genetic
Code and GeneticEngineering,in CELL AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY

522-24 (1987). Examples of such recombinant DNA products include human insulin, interferon, human growth hormone, hepatitis B
vaccines, and certain coagulation factors, all of which are currently
clinically available. Id.Indeed, such products are ubiquitous, and are
regularly prescribed by physicians.
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sembling "lego" blocks) until chemical bonding took
place. 23 By repeating these steps according to a programmed set of instructions, a nanotechnological approach
would be able to produce substances that conventional
biotechnology could not (say, because they are toxic to
living organisms, or use elements that living organisms
cannot handle efficiently) and would be able to do so with
greater speed and lower expense.24 This advantage would
increase with an increase in complexity on the part of the
desired molecules.
With relatively mature technology, we might expect to
see general-purpose chemical synthesizers using
nanotechnology. The desired molecule would be modeled
on a computer screen, the assemblers would be provided
with the proper feedstock solutions, and the product would
be available in minutes. This application ofnanotechnology
would be relatively simple. More complex applications
might use groups of assemblers programmed to produce
molecules and then hook them together into large structures:
rocket engines, computer chips, or whatever is desired.25
Besides allowing such efficient and powerful manufacturing capabilities, more sophisticated applications of
nanotechnology would allow far more subtle applications.26
For example, specially designed nanodevices, the size of
bacteria, might be programmed to destroy arterial plaque, or
cancer cells, or to repair cellular damage caused by aging,
and then be injected into the body. 27 After performing their
tasks, the devices may be induced to self-destruct, or remain
in a surveillance mode, or, in some cases, integrate themselves into the body's cells. Such devices would have dramatic implications for the practice of medicine, and for society as a whole.
Environmental Risks and Benefits
Obviously, a technology of such capabilities offers both upsides and downsides. Some are beyond the scope of this Article: for example, Bill Joy's celebrated fear that
nanotechnology may lead to superintelligent machines that
will use their intelligence to achieve world domination and
replace humanity. 28 (Personally, I find this unlikely. A simple glance at the headlines should be enough to dispel the
belief that world domination is secured through superior intelligence. At least, if that happens, it will be the first time in
human history that it has occurred that way.)
Risks
There are, however, genuine environmental risks to
nanotechnology, and the nature and extent of these risks has
occupied the literature in the field since the beginning. At
the grossest level, there is the fear that someone will design
self-replicating nanorobots, capable of making copies of
23. See DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 181, 197-207 (dis-

cussing "chemical mechanosynthesis").
24. See id.
25. DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION, supra note 17, at 60-62.
26. Though the implications, in terms of performance, of order-of-magnitude weight reductions in aerospace hardware are more dramatic
than the simple statement might suggest.
27. DREXLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 212-13, 210, 224.
28. Bill Joy, Why the FutureDoesn't Need Us, WIRED, Apr. 2000, at 238,
available at http://www.wired.conwired/archive/8.04/joy.html.
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themselves from materials found in nature, and that those
nanorobots will convert everything in the world into copies of themselves, thus wiping out the entire biosphere. In
nanotechnology circles, this is known as the "gray goo"
problem, after the notion that such uncontrolled replication will lead to the entire world being turned into, well,
gray goo.
Such a notion is, to say the least, disturbing. While it is
probably true that we already possess the capacity to substantially destroy the biosphere using nuclear weapons, or
even advanced military biotechnology, the prospect of an
unstoppable wave of nanorobots devouring everything in a
fashion vaguely reminiscent of the science fiction movie
The Blob seems somehow spookier and more frightening.
Fortunately, further study suggests that such an event could
29
take place only by deliberate action, not by accident.
Deliberate action, however, is not impossible. More serious environmental threats involve the military or terroristic
use of nanotechnology (already, the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the main sponsors of nanotechnology research).30 Military nanotechnology is likely to be less
grossly destructive than self-replicating "gray goo," but
harmful enough in its own way. Early military uses of
nanotechnology are likely to involve sensors and similar
comparatively benign applications. 31 More advanced applications, however, are likely to be both powerful and subtle:
devices that can infiltrate electronics and seize control at
crucial moments, artificial "disease" agents that can rest
harmlessly in victims' bodies until activated by an external
signal, and so on. Some of these will have no significant
impact on the nonhuman environment, but nanotechnology-based agents for crop destruction, forest-cover removal, and area-denial applications are likely to pose familiar environmental problems in a new fashion. On the more
positive side, it is possible that such agents will be less persistent and less broadly destructive than, say, Agent Orange
or conventional land mines.32 Set against this possibility is
the prospect that these agents will be used more broadly for
that very reason, along with the possibility-impossible at
29. On further examination, the "gray goo" problem turned out to be less
fearsome than originally imagined: it turns out to be virtually impossible to occur by accident, and quite difficult to bring about on purpose. See Robert A. Freitas Jr., Some Limits to Global Ecophagy by
Biovorous Replicators, With Public Policy Recommendations, at
http://www.foresight.org/NanoRev/Ecophagy.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2001).
30. See Neil MacDonald, DOD Plans to Award 16 Grants to Schools in
Nanotechnology, Fed. Tech. Rep., Mar. 22, 2001, at 5, 2001 WL
12451435 (describing first awards in the new Defense University
Research Initiative (DURINT) program on nanotechnology). This is
unclassified research, and is separate from the civilian National
Nanotechnology Initiative. It is harder to pin down the extent ofclassified research, though rumor puts it at substantial levels. On a personal note, I have conversed with researchers from national laboratories who described their classified military nanotechnology work
as sufficiently advanced and threatening that "you don't want to
know." Even allowing for the inevitable hyperbole, there seems no
reason to doubt the presence of significant classified military
nanotechnology research.
31. See, e.g., Future Soldiers Could Get Enhanced Minds, UPI, Mar. 19,
2001 (available on LEXIS) (describing planned use of
nanotechnology to enhance soldiers' cognition and decisionmaking
under stress).
32. On land mines and related technologies, see Jack H. McCall Jr., Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and Limits
on the Indiscriminate Use ofLand Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT'L &

ComP. L. 229, 232 (1994).
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this point to quantify, but irresponsible to dismiss-that
they will not work as well or as "safely" as intended.
Nanotechnological devices for military use also raise the
issue that they do the work of chemical and biological
weapons, but-at least arguably-do not fall within treaties regulating chemical and biological weapons. The argument that nanotechnological weapons-at least those of
destructive, rather than surveillance, type-would be
functional equivalents of chemical and biological weapons
would be a strong one, and indeed destructive nanoweapons would probably achieve their effects through
chemical action, though it would be mechanically initiated. Nonetheless, as the Reagan Administration's efforts
to reinterpret the ABM Treaty illustrate, national governments do not require much encouragement to advance
novel or disingenuous interpretations of the law where doing so serves their interests.33
Controlling these military applications will be difficult.
Military interest in nanotechnology is already high, and an
unknown, but large, amount of military nanotechnology research is going on at present; this is sure to increase as the
actual application of nanotechnology becomes more feasible. It is not too early, however, to look at updating the
chemical and biological warfare conventions, and other related instruments, and to explore ways in which employment of destructive nanotechnology is constrained by the
laws of war.
There is also a risk that civilian applications of nanotechnology will not work as well or as cleanly as expected.
This risk is almost certainly smaller than similar risks associated with military technologies, since civilian technologies tend to be more robust, and founded on a much deeper
experience base than military technologies. (This characteristic is even more pronounced when the manufacturing or
coding standards are open, which is why "open source" software is generally more reliable and robust than proprietary
"closed source" software. This lesson has not been lost on
nanotechnology enthusiasts.) 34 Nonetheless, as nanotechnology moves out of the laboratory and into the marketplace, it will be important to develop standards that ensure
that its products (and byproducts, if any) do not have dangerous effects.
In many ways, these risks are likely to be lower and more
manageable than those associated with biotechnology, both
at military and civilian levels. Although one can imagine
nanodevices of fiendish subtlety and destructiveness, it will
in fact be quite some time, if ever, before it is possible to design a nanodevice that approaches the smallpox virus (even
in its pristine, non-biowar form) for virulence or lethality.
Despite fears of self-replicating nanodevices, the world is
already full of self-replicating lethal agents that menace us
on a continuous basis, and governments have been working
for decades to make those agents more lethal. Most of our
problems in coming decades will stem from these agents,
not from conjectural nanoplagues.
33. The ABM Treaty reinterpretation debate is discussed in GLENN H.
REYNOLDS & ROBERT

P.

MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF

LAW AND POLICY 94-101 (2d ed. 1997).
34. See Bryan Randolph Bruns, Open Sourcing Nanotechnology Research and Development: Some Considerations, Paper presented at
the Eighth Foresight Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology
(Nov. 3-5,2000). Abstract available online at http://www.foresight.
org/Conferences/MNT8/Abstracts/Bruns/.

6-2001

NEWS & ANALYSIS

Benefits

If the environmental dangers of misapplied nanotechnology
are significant, the environmental benefits of nanotechnology properly employed are dramatic; it was not hyperbole when Terence McKenna called nanotechnology a radical green vision. 35 Since nanotechnology involves atomby-atom construction, it will be able to create substances,
and even finished objects, without producing the dangerous
and messy byproducts that most current manufacturing processes produce. Nanodevices will operate in a liquid containing the necessary raw materials (usually carbon or silicon, with trace amounts of other elements as needed) and
will simply plug the appropriate atoms in the appropriate
places to produce the desired end product. Such processes
should produce few byproducts, and those byproducts can
be readily purified (by other nanodevices) and recycled
back into feedstocks.
What is more, most products of nanotechnology will be
made of simple and abundant elements: carbon, in diamond
or diamondoid form, is seen as the basis of most
nanomanufacturing. Products made of such materials will
be very strong, meaning that smaller amounts of material
can be used, and carbon is an abundant material, meaning
that little in the way of exploration and extraction will be
needed. Indeed, as a greenhouse remediation measure,
nanodevices could even extract carbon dioxide from the air
if desired.
This clean manufacturing is a significant benefit of
nanotechnology, but in some sense it is less important than
the economic regime that it makes possible. When materials
are inexpensive, and structures of great strength and low
weight can be manufactured cheaply, energy requirements
for many activities drop enormously. If, for example, we can
make cars that are stronger and safer than contemporary vehicles, but that weigh one-fourth (or even one-tenth) as
much, electric vehicles become far more practical. Indeed,
with materials of very high strength to weight, solar-powered vehicles become practical. Similarly, strong, inexpensive, energy-efficient buildings would become far more
practical, further reducing energy demand. Many experts
also believe that atom-by-atom manufacturing will make
low-cost, high-efficiency solar cells practical. The combination of reduced energy demand and inexpensive solar
power may make most of today's power generation and
transmission infrastructure unnecessary. The payoff from
such improvements would be enormous, not only in terms of
reduced pollution from power generation, but in terms of reduced environmental impact all along the production and
distribution chain: less damage from power-line construction and maintenance, less damage from transformer leakage, and, of course, less damage from coal mining, oil extraction, nuclear fuel-cycle operations, and so on.
Beyond these impacts, more advanced nanotechnology
may allow active remediation of many environmental problems. For example, toxic wastes in contaminated aquifers
35. For an excellent overview of nanotechnology's environmental risks
and benefits, see Neil Jacobstein, Nanotechnology and Molecular
Manufacturing: Opportunities and Risks, Presentation at Doug
Engelbart's Unfinished Revolution Colloquium at Stanford University (Jan. 20, 2000), available online at: http://bootstrap.org/
colloquium/session 03/session_03_jacobstein.html. This topic is
also addressed at length in DREXLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 181-98.
The following discussion draws on both sources.
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may be neutralized by specially designed nanorobots that
selectively capture undesirable molecules and then either
sequester them for removal or (where the danger is chemical, not nuclear) break them down into harmless substances.
While nanodevices cannot, for example, render radioactive
materials nonradioactive, they could capture molecules of
radioactive waste and concentrate them into a form that
would be easily removed.
What to Do
At this early date, nanotechnology remains mostly a matter
for laboratory work and computer simulations. That, however, makes this a good time to think about ways of regulating nanotechnology that will allow us to reap its benefits
while avoiding the harms that can result from misuse. In
1999, the Foresight Institute, a Silicon Valley foundation
devoted to exploring issues relating to advanced technologies, sponsored a conference intended to start the discussion
on regulation of nanotechnology. Conference participants
included representatives from the scientific, industrial, environmental, academic, and defense communities, and
comprised a very diverse group of individuals, backgrounds, and agendas. Surprisingly, there were several areas
of consensus.
The first was that simply renouncing nanotechnology-even if such a course were deemed desirable-is impossible. Unlike nuclear weapons research (which itself is
poorly controlled), nanotechnology research and development does not require a large or specialized infrastructure.
Indeed, the conceptual work has largely been done, and although many technical difficulties remain to be overcome,
the barriers to the implementation of nanotechnology are in
the nature of engineering, not basic science. In short, it was
agreed that nanotechnology would be developed regardless
of any efforts to suppress it, and that such efforts would only
ensure that whatever research took place would do so in
rogue nations, with few constraints.
The second was that proper regulation, and the use of
what Arthur Kantrowitz has called "the weapon of openness, 13 6 could nonetheless serve to control risks of improper
use of nanotechnology. The Foresight conference produced
a set of draft guidelines for research and use of nanotechnology that were designed to achieve these ends, and this
draft was placed on the Foresight website for comment and
critique. Many comments and criticisms were incorporated
in several revisions of the draft, the current version of which
is attached as an appendix to this Article. This process continues, and readers are encouraged to participate.
The third conclusion was that regulating nanotechnology
will be a process, not an event. While it is not too early for
thought, it is certainly too early for legislation, and an attempt to create some sort of overarching legal code for nanotechnology in advance of the facts would likely be disastrous in light of our imperfect knowledge at this point. As
technology develops, and as society changes, regulatory approaches will have to keep pace. We are fortunate that we
have some years-or perhaps a couple of decades-before
such matters become urgent. We would be wise to make use of
that time to think things through, before events surpass us.
36. Arthur Kantrowitz, The Weapon of Openness, FORESIGHT BACKGROUND No.4(1990) (arguing that the maintenance of an open society is the best defense against misuse of technology). Available online at http://www.foresight.orgUpdates/Background4.htm.
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Conclusion
This all-too-brief discussion has outlined the basic character
ofnanotechnology and the risks and benefits it presents. The
technology of the very small poses issues sufficiently large
that many minds will be required to address them. I encourage readers to add their thoughts to the process. More than
most lawyers, environmental lawyers have firsthand experience with the considerations (and limitations) inherent in
the application of law to advanced technologies amid conditions of technical and societal uncertainty. That expertise is
likely to be helpful.
Appendix: The Foresight Guidelines
Preamble
The term "Molecular Nanotechnology" (MNT) refers to the
ability to program matter with molecular precision, and
scale it to three-dimensional products of arbitrary size. This
developing technology presents an unprecedented new set
of technical and economic opportunities. The opportunities
include: the development of inexpensive and abundant
diamondoid building materials with a strength-to-weight ratio 50 times greater than titanium, the possibility of widespread material abundance for all the Earth's people, the development of revolutionary new techniques in medicine,
and the opening of the space frontier for development.
Along with these new capabilities come new risks, and new
responsibilities. The acceptance of these responsibilities is
not optional. The future capabilities of MNT also raise an
unprecedented set of military, security and environmental
issues. Dealing with these issues proactively will be critical
to the positive development of the field.
The Foresight Guidelines were developed during and after a workshop on Molecular Nanotechnology (MNT) Research Policy Guidelines sponsored by the Foresight Institute and the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing (IMM).
The workshop was conducted over the February 19-21,
1999, weekend in Monterey, California. Participants included: James Bennett, Greg Burch, K. Eric Drexler, Neil
Jacobstein, Tanya Jones, Ralph Merkle, Mark Miller,
Ed Niehaus, Pat Parker, Christine Peterson, Glenn
Reynolds, and Philippe Van Nedervelde. The resulting
Foresight Guidelines ("the Guidelines") include assumptions, principles, and some specific recommendations intended to provide a basis for responsible development of
molecular nanotechnology.
Continued research and education are needed to create a
shared understanding and sufficient knowledge base on the
entire set of MNT development and risk management issues
that must be addressed. While discussion of guidelines can
begin today, the scientific and technical community will
continue to evolve its understanding of the issues. The
Guidelines have already changed over time to reflect that
dynamic understanding and input by a wider community
(see Background section).
Future discussions of this subject should include detailed
consideration of the economic and environmental benefits
of MNT, as well as the potential problems. In particular, the
need for some controls should not prevent the responsible
development of the technology. Rather than have reflexive,
or poorly informed controls imposed upon the MNT R&D
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process, the developing MNT R&D community and industry should adopt appropriate self-imposed controls, formulated in light of current knowledge and the evolving state of
the art. The possibility of the necessity for additional controls remains an open question, and its resolution may depend to some extent on the success of voluntary controls.
The NIH Guidelines on Recombinant DNA technology
are an example of self-regulation taken by the biotechnology community almost 25 years ago. While the kind of artificial molecular machines of primary interest for
nanotechnology are expected to be very different from the
kind of biological systems covered by the NIH Guidelines
(just as a 747 is very different from a sparrow, even though
both fly), the NIH Guidelines illustrate that advance preparations are possible and can be effective. Those guidelines
were so well accepted that the privately funded research
community has continued to submit research protocols for
juried review, in spite of the fact that it was optional for them
to do so. In addition, although the NIH Guidelines have been
progressively relaxed since they were first released, they did
achieve their intended effect.
Experimenters and industry should have the maximum
safe opportunities to develop and commercialize the molecular manufacturing industry. In addition, MNT should be
developed in ways that make it possible to distribute the
benefits of the technology to the four fifths of humanity currently desperate to achieve material wealth at any environmental or security cost. Providing technical abundance
alone cannot make a people wealthy and secure. This also
requires education, and social arrangements described as a
high-trust, civil society. However, technological abundance
can alleviate many of the conflicts that stem primarily from
rivalry over resources. Reducing this specific cause of conflict via molecular manufacturing could make the world
more secure than it is today. In addition, the release from
bare economic subsistence could enable billions of people
to take advantage of the emerging global classroom over the
World Wide Web. This education effect could compound
the positive environmental and security benefits of MNT.
Relevant ecological and public health principles must be
utilized in conducting MNT R&D. Diamondoid products
may not break down easily in the natural environment. Furthermore, consumers may not at first have means readily
available to recycle them. Thus, total "product lifecycle"
considerations should be taken into consideration as the
MNT industry develops.
Effective means of restricting the misuse of MNT in the
international arena need to be developed. Adding MNT to
the list of technologies covered in Chemical, Biological and
Nuclear Weapons treaties might seem appropriate, but it
could lead to the unintended consequence that only the U.S.
and other rule following nations would be at a competitive
disadvantage economically and militarily. While most nations are likely to adhere to reasonable restrictions, guidelines that are viewed as too restrictive will simply be ignored, paradoxically increasing risk. While a 100% effective ban could, in theory, avoid the potential risks of
nanotechnology, a 99.99% effective ban would result in development and deployment by the 0.01% that evaded and
ignored the ban. There are reasonable arguments on both
sides of the treaty question. However, at this time, the
Guideline participants as a group do not endorse any spe-
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cific initiative to address MNT safety and security concerns
through treaty arrangements.
The safe development and use of MNT depends, in part,
on the good judgment of the researchers carrying out this
work. The more clearly this is recognized, the more effective researchers are likely to be in avoiding and actively preventing unsafe uses of MNT and in insuring that commercial systems have built-in safeguards. The "moral repugnance" associated with biological weapons may have attenuated their development and use, in spite of the fact that they
are relatively easy to make and deploy.
Eventually, MNT policy will have to balance potential
risks with known benefits, and distinguish between different
classes of risks. Molecular Manufacturing and
nanotechnology are not one thing, but rather a spectrum of
technologies, with radically different risk profiles. A substantial R&D program is needed to clarify the nature, magnitude and likelihood of the potential risks, as well as the options available for dealing with them effectively.
There are significant risks associated with failing to address ongoing economic and environmental problems that
the development of MNT could help resolve. The Guidelines were not intended to cover every risk or potential abuse
of the technology. People still abuse automobiles, and society has responded both by making cars safer to operate,
holding drivers accountable for their actions through laws
that are enforced, and requiring drivers to pay for automobile insurance. Likewise, industry and governments are held
responsible for their use of technologies that have widespread impact.
The Guidelines are intended to cover most of the risks
associated with normal development and use of the technology, and to mitigate, as much as possible, the risks associated with potential abuse of the technology. Informed
MNT policy could accelerate the safe development of
peaceful and environmentally responsible uses of the technology. This includes capturing the opportunity to develop
powerful new approaches to medicine, as well as energy
efficient and zero emission manufacturing and transportation technologies.
Principles
People who work in the MNT field should develop and utilize professional guidelines that are grounded in reliable
technology, and knowledge of the environmental, security,
ethical, and economic issues relevant to the development
of MNT.
MNT includes a wide variety of technologies that have
very different risk profiles. Access to the end products of
MNT should be distinguished from access to the various
forms of the underlying development technology. Access to
MNT products should be unrestricted unless this access
poses a risk to global security.
Accidental or willful misuse of MNT must be constrained
by legal liability and, where appropriate, subject to criminal prosecution.
Governments, companies, and individuals who refuse
or fail to follow responsible principles and guidelines for
development and dissemination of MNT should, if possible, be placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect to access to MNT intellectual property, technology,
and markets.
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MNT device designs should incorporate provisions for
built-in safety mechanisms, such as: 1) absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel source or artificial "vitamins"
that don't exist in any natural environment; 2) making devices that are dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation; 3) routing control signal
paths throughout a device, so that subassemblies do not
function independently; 4) programming termination dates
into devices, and 5) other innovations in laboratory or device safety technology developed specifically to address the
potential dangers of MNT. Further research is needed on
MINT risk management, as well as the theory, mechanisms,
and experimental designs for built-in safeguard systems.
The global community of nations and non-governmental organizations need to develop effective means of restricting the misuse of MNT. Such means should not restrict the development of peaceful applications of the technology or defensive measures by responsible members of
the international community. Further research in this area
is encouraged.
MNT research and development should be conducted
with due regard to existing principles of ecological and public health. MNT products should be promoted which incorporate systems for minimizing negative ecological and public health impact.
Any specific regulation adopted by researchers, industry
or government should provide specific, clear guidelines.
Regulators should have specific and clear mandates, providing efficient and fair methods for identifying different
classes of hazards and for carrying out inspection and enforcement. There is great value in seeking the minimum
necessary legal environment to ensure the safe and secure
development of this technology.
Development Principles
1. Artificial replicators must not be capable of replication
in a natural, uncontrolled environment.
2. Evolution within the context of a self-replicating manufacturing system is discouraged.
3. Any replicated information should be error free.
4. MNT device designs should specifically limit proliferation and provide traceability of any replicating systems.
5. Developers should attempt to consider systematically
the environmental consequences of the technology, and to
limit these consequences to intended effects. This requires
significant research on environmental models, risk management, as well as the theory, mechanisms, and experimental
designs for built-in safeguard systems.
6. Industry self-regulation should be designed in whenever possible. Economic incentives could be provided
through discounts on insurance policies for MNT development organizations that certify Guidelines compliance.
Willingness to provide self-regulation should be one condition for access to advanced forms of the technology.
7. Distribution of molecular manufacturing development
capability should be restricted, whenever possible, to responsible actors that have agreed to use the Guidelines. No
such restriction need apply to end products of the development process that satisfy the Guidelines.
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Specific Design Guidelines
1. Any self-replicating device which has sufficient
onboard information to describe its own manufacture
should encrypt it such that any replication error will randomize its blueprint.
2. Encrypted MNT device instruction sets should be utilized to discourage irresponsible proliferation and piracy.
3. Mutation (autonomous and otherwise) outside of
sealed laboratory conditions, should be discouraged.
4. Replication systems should generate audit trails.
5. MNT device designs should incorporate provisions for
built-in safety mechanisms, such as: 1) absolute dependence
on a single artificial fuel source or artificial "vitamins" that
don't exist in any natural environment; 2) making devices
that are dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation; 3) routing control signal
paths throughout a device, so that subassemblies do not
function independently; 4) programming termination dates
into devices, and 5) other innovations in laboratory or device safety technology developed specifically to address the
potential dangers of MNT.
6. MNT developers should adopt systematic security
measures to avoid unplanned distribution of their designs
and technical capabilities.
Background
The idea of guidelines for the safe development of MNT
(Molecular Nanotechnology) has been discussed within the
Foresight community for over a decade. It is inevitable that
any guidelines put forth today will be further discussed and
perhaps substantively changed; but the dialog on specific
proposals must begin somewhere.
In spite of the diversity of briefing materials and views
represented at the Monterey workshop in February of 1999,
the participants managed to discuss the technical and policy
issues with both intensity and civility. While any one participant might have preferred more or less emphasis on a particular issue, the group was able to converge on a common set
of draft guidelines for the development of MNT.
The group agreed to review the Guidelines among themselves, discuss them in wider Foresight meetings during
1999, and then release them on the WWW for review by the
larger community. The goal was to get the Guidelines endorsed and adopted by organizations sponsoring MNT research and development projects, and to inspire effective
self-regulation wherever necessary and possible.
Another goal of the Workshop members was to educate
MNT researchers about the potential benefits and risks of
the technology. The long-term goal was to eventually produce a dialog and set of Guidelines that would be useful to
policy makers, the public, and the MNT research and development community.
The Foresight Guidelines were intended as a living document, subject to modification and revision. Early drafts have
been reviewed and revised several times since the Monterey
workshop, including during Foresight/IMM sponsored dis-
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cussions led by Neil Jacobstein in May and November of
1999. They were also provided in the attachments to Ralph
Merkle's June 1999 Congressional testimony on MNT
[available at http://www.merkle.com/papers/nanohearing
1999.html and http://www.house.gov/science/merkle_
062299.htm], and referenced in Neil Jacobstein's presentation on Nanotechnology and Molecular Manufacturing: Opportunities and Risks at Stanford University's Colloquium
for Doug Engelbart in January of 2000 [available at
http://bootstrap.org/colloquium/session_03/session 03
jacobstein.html]. The Workshop participants debated
whether the Guidelines were sufficiently developed for
widespread publication, when Bill Joy's article: "Why the
Future Doesn't Need Us" [available at http://www.wired.
com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html] was published in the
April 2000 issue of Wired Magazine. This article raised public awareness of the potential dangers of self-replicating
technologies, including nanotechnology.
Since that time, the Guidelines were reviewed critically
by Robert Freitas, and revised by Ralph Merkle and Neil
Jacobstein. Version 3.6 of the Guidelines was discussed in a
May 2000 Foresight workshop session led by Neil
Jacobstein. Bill Joy was invited to participate in this discussion. He made several constructive suggestions, including
one that outlined a guideline on closing the economic incentives loop via an insurance policy requirement for developers. Jacobstein incorporated the feedback from this and subsequent discussions into version 3.7 of the Guidelines, and
they were then published for open review on the web.
Version 3.7 of the Guidelines are available at the Foresight web URL: http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/. This
text, like most web text, can be annotated using software
called Crit, which enables in-line comments to be made using a web browser. Information about the use of Crit can be
found at http://crit.org. We encourage your ideas and constructive criticism about how to improve the Guidelines.
Eventually, the Guidelines need to become sufficiently
specific that they can form the basis for a legally enforceable
framework within which MNT development can be safely
pursued. Future versions of the MNT Guidelines might
eventually be enforced via a variety of means, possibly including lab certifications, randomized open inspections,
professional society guidelines and peer pressure, insurance
requirements and policies, stiff legal and economic penalties for violations, and other sanctions. Enforcement will be
inherently imperfect, but the deterrent effect of unpredictable inspection, combined with predictable and swift consequences for violations, may prove preferable to the available alternatives.
Care must be taken that future revisions of the Guidelines
do not become so restrictive that they simply drive MNT research and development underground. This could expose
compliant countries to the increased risks associated with
decreased technical, economic, and military capabilities. It
would also sacrifice the many significant economic, environmental, and medical benefits of MNT that counteract serious and certain risks that society now faces in industrialized countries and particularly in the developing world.

